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Abstract—Covert channels aim to hide the existence of
communication between two or more parties. Such chan-
nels typically utilise pre-existing overt data transmissions
to carry hidden messages. Recently, Murdoch proposed
a temperature-based covert channel where information is
transmitted by remotely inducing and measuring changes
of temperature of an intermediate/target host. The channel
was invented mainly for the purpose of attacking anony-
mous servers, but could also be used for general-purpose
covert communications. We propose a method for estimat-
ing the channel capacity, which largely depends on the
intermediate host. Evaluation of two different intermediate
hosts shows upper bounds for the channel capacity of 10.8–
15.4 and 16.4–21.1 bits per hour depending on the noise.
Index Terms—Security, Temperature-based Covert
Channels, Capacity
I. INTRODUCTION
Often the simple fact that communication exists is
enough to cause third parties to become suspicious and
take further actions. Covert channels aim to hide the very
existence of communications [1]. Individuals and groups
have various reasons to utilise covert channels, often
motivated by the existence of an adversarial relation-
ship between two parties. Examples include government
agencies versus criminal or terrorist organisations, hack-
ers or corporate spies versus company IT departments,
or dissenting citizens versus their governments.
Many network protocol-based covert channels have
been proposed ranging from very simple channels (e.g.
encoding covert information in unused header bits)
to more complex channels (e.g. encoding covert bits
in packet timing) [1]. Recently, Murdoch proposed a
temperature-based covert channel where covert informa-
tion is transmitted by remotely inducing and measuring
changes of temperature [2]. Initially proposed for identi-
fying anonymous servers, such as hidden services in the
Tor anonymisation network [3], Murdoch’s channel can
also be used for general-purpose covert communications.
In a temperature-based covert channel the covert
sender (by convention Alice) modulates the CPU load
of an unwitting intermediate host or the target host in
anonymity attacks by varying the rate of requests sent to
it based on the covert bits to be sent. The change in CPU
load changes the temperature, which in turn changes the
skew of the intermediate host’s clock. The covert receiver
(by convention Bob) probes the intermediate host’s clock
and recovers the covert bits by estimating the clock-skew
changes [2].
Two scenarios are possible. In the first scenario the
intermediate host is separated from both Bob and Alice
by a network (see Figure 1). Alice and Bob could be
controlled by the same person (e.g. attacking Tor hidden










Figure 1. Temperature-based covert channel where Alice and Bob
are separated from the intermediate host by a network
In the second scenario Alice is located on the in-
termediate host and manipulates the CPU load directly.
Only Bob is separated from the intermediate host by a
network. This is a possible scenario for the ex-filtration
of sensitive information. To determine the usefulness
or threat (depending on the viewpoint) of the channel
it is necessary to know the channel capacity, which
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is the maximum transmission rate at which error-free
communication is possible [4].
We propose a method to estimate the capacity of
Murdoch’s temperature-based covert channel. We model
the channel as Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN)
channel [5]. The channel capacity depends on the chan-
nel’s bandwidth and signal to noise ratio (SNR). We
create a simulation model that models the relationship
between CPU load and clock skew and use it to estimate
the bandwidth and signal power. We estimate the noise
power from empirical measurements of the channel with-
out an input signal. Our empirical evaluation of two dif-
ferent intermediate hosts shows that the channel capacity
is 10.8–15.4 and 16.4–21.1 bits per hour depending on
the noise. Since we assumed ideal conditions for Alice
and Bob these capacities are upper bounds.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section II we
describe our methodology for estimating the capacity. In
Section III we describe the creation of the simulation
model including the empirical measurements. In Section
IV we examine the channel noise. In Section V we
describe how the channel bandwidth is estimated, and
present the results. Section VI discusses possible coun-
termeasures against the channel. Section VII concludes
and outlines future work.
II. METHODOLOGY
Ambient temperature and humidity vary over time and
affect the measured clock skew [2]. However, ambient
changes usually happen on longer timescales and it
is possible to remove these long-term trends from the
clock skew output. With this our system is time-invariant
as the output depends only on the input and some
additive noise. Since the channel suffers from multiple
independent sources of noise we assume the noise is
approximately Gaussian (Central Limit Theorem), which
is confirmed by our empirical measurements.
Therefore, we model the temperature-based channel
as AWGN channel and the channel capacity can be
computed based on the channel bandwidth and SNR
[5]. Figure 2 shows our channel model. The input of
the AWGN channel is a clock skew signal generated
by Alice sS (t). The output of the channel r (t) is the
clock skew signal measured by Bob plus the noise.
The noise n (t) includes noise introduced by the clock
skew estimation (mainly network jitter and timestamp
quantisation noise [2], [6]) as well as noise caused by
CPU load or temperature fluctuations.
We estimate the noise power for a particular interme-
diate host from empirical measurements of r (t) without
any input signal sS (t). With ambient temperature trends








Simulation model AWGN channel
Figure 2. Model of the temperature-based covert channel
noise approximately follows a Gaussian distribution (see
Section IV).
Alice can only indirectly manipulate sS (t) by mod-
ulating CPU load sL (t). To model the relationship be-
tween sL (t) and sS (t) through changes of temperature
sT (t) we create a simulation model (see Section III).
The model needs to be parametrised according to the
empirically measured behaviour of a particular interme-
diate host (see Section III). Using this simulation model
we estimate the channel bandwidth and the signal power
for particular intermediate hosts (see Section V).
In our evaluation we assume ideal conditions for
Alice and Bob. Alice’s signal power is maximal because
Alice is located on the intermediate host and CPU load
is controlled directly (scenario 2). On the other hand
we assume the noise is minimal. The improved clock
skew estimation technique [6] is used and hence times-
tamp quantisation noise is minimised. Network jitter is
minimal as our testbed is small. Ambient temperature
changes are also small because all PCs were located in
climate-controlled rooms.
III. CREATING THE SIMULATION MODEL
We first describe the experiments carried out for fitting
the simulation model and then describe the simulation
model.
A. Experiments
The first intermediate host (intermediate 1) was a
2.4 GHz Intel Celeron CPU inside a midi-tower case
running Linux 2.6. Both CPU and power supply fans
ran at constant speed. The second intermediate host
(intermediate 2) was a 2.8 GHz Intel Pentium CPU inside
a desktop case running FreeBSD 4.10. It had a more
effective thermally-controlled CPU fan designed so that
most of the warm air is directly blown out of the case.
Alice was located on the intermediate host. Bob was
a second PC running Linux 2.6 connected to the same
network switch.
CPU load was induced using cpuburn [7]. During
the experiments no network traffic, besides Bob’s clock
probes, was send to the intermediate host. Also, no other
processes ran that used significant amounts of CPU time.
However, housekeeping processes used minimal CPU
resources and could have caused some network traffic.
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In our experiments we generated periodic square wave
signals sL (t) and remotely measured the resulting sS (t).
Each signal period of the periodic signal was a time of
maximum induced CPU load (approximately 100% load)
followed by the same time of idle CPU (approximately
0% load) allowing the system to cool down to its
previously unloaded temperature. Each experiment con-
sisted of 10 consecutive signal periods. We ran separate
experiments using load-inducement times of 180, 300,
600, 1200, 1800, 2400 and 3600 seconds.
Changes in the ambient temperature or humidity affect
the clock crystal and hence introduce noise. During our
experiments we tried to minimise this noise. PCs were
located in climate-controlled rooms and we performed
measurements during times where doors and windows
were closed and no humans were inside the rooms.
Nevertheless, there were some changes in the ambient
conditions. However, these ambient changes usually hap-
pen on longer timescales and it is possible to remove
long-term trends from the measured sS (t). Furthermore,
if the induced clock-skew change is large the noise has
a much smaller magnitude than the signal.
Clock skew can only be estimated rather than directly
measured with noise being introduced by network jitter
and timestamp quantisation [2]. We queried the TCP
clock [8] of the intermediate hosts with an average
frequency of 1 Hz. Since we used the improved clock-
skew estimation technique [6], the timestamp quantisa-
tion noise was very low despite low clock frequencies
of 250 Hz (intermediate 1) and 100 Hz (intermediate 2).
Connecting Alice and Bob to the same switch minimised
network jitter. But even for long uncongested paths
network jitter is often skewed towards low values [6].
One clock-skew estimate is obtained for time windows
of w seconds, containing w clock samples in our case.
If w is set too small, the clock skew estimates contain
a lot of noise. On the other hand too large w lead
to averaging which prevents the accurate measurement
of steep changes. In order to get more frequent clock-
skew estimates without reducing the window size over-
sampling can be used [6]. Figure 3 shows the estimated
clock skew for 3600 s load inducement on intermediate 1
for w = 120 s and w = 600 s (average over the 10
periods). The oversampling factor was chosen so that
one clock-skew estimate is obtained every 30 s regardless
of w. Note that consistent with [2] throughout the paper
we always use negated clock skew since usually negated
clock skew is proportional to temperature and CPU load.
The figure clearly shows the higher noise with 120 s
windows. On the other hand the averaging caused by
600 s windows is also clearly visible when looking at
the steep clock-skew decrease occurring when the load































Figure 3. Effect of clock-skew estimation window size on the shape
of the received signal
inducement ends. This averaging is more problematic for
shorter load-inducements. We examined window sizes
of 60, 120, 180, 240, 300 and 600 seconds. We found
that for 60 s and 120 s windows the noise was very high
whereas for windows of 240 s and larger there is too
much averaging.
Therefore, for intermediate 1 we selected w = 180 s.
However, for intermediate 2 the induced clock-skew
changes are almost one magnitude smaller. To limit
the noise to acceptable levels we used w = 600 s.
Oversampling was used to get one clock skew estimate
every 30 s regardless of w.
B. Simulation Model
We developed the simulation model using Matlab
Simulink [9]. The input of the model is a CPU load
signal sL (t) (values ranging from 0 to 1) and the
output of the model is the clock-skew signal sS (t)
(values in parts per million). The model is loosely based
on Simulink’s thermal model of a house, but is more
complex since it has two heat capacitors instead of one.
One capacitor has a larger capacity and heats up slower
while the other has a smaller capacity and heats up
quicker. We hypothesise that the first capacitor is the
inside of the PC’s case, while the second capacitor is
the CPU and heat sink.
Figure 4 shows the model for intermediate 1 (the
capacities which are not shown in the figure are C1 =
2.625−6 and C2 = 1.675−6). The gain constants and
capacities are specific for intermediate 1 and were fitted
based on the empirical data. However, the structure of
the model is generic. For intermediate 2 we use the
same model but with different gain constants and heat
capacities. We believe the model could be applied to
other potential intermediate hosts as the overall shape of
CPU load induced clock-skew changes looks similar for
other PCs [2].

























Figure 4. Matlab Simulink model for simulating the relationship between CPU load and clock skew (parametrised for intermediate host 1)


























































Figure 5. Comparison of normalised clock-skew output of simulation model and empirical measurements for intermediate host 1 (left) and
intermediate host 2 (right)
We used the same CPU load signals previously used
in the empirical measurements as input for the model.
Figure 5 compares the clock-skew change experimentally
measured (average over all 10 signal periods) with the
output of the model. Overall there is a very good match.
For the shortest load inducement times the measured
peaks are slightly lower than the predicted peaks because
of the averaging effect. Despite the larger window size
the empirical data for intermediate 2 is much noisier
given that the clock-skew changes are almost one mag-
nitude smaller. Note that all clock skew estimates have
been de-trended from long-term ambient temperature
changes and normalised to allow direct comparison.
Hence Figure 5 shows relative changes of clock skew
rather than the real absolute values.
With ambient changes removed our system is basically
time-invariant as sS (t) depends only on sL (t). Ideally
our system would also be linear, as linear time invariant
system are easy to analyse. Unfortunately, our experi-
mental system shows non-linear behaviour.
Key sources of non-linearity are the thermally-
controlled CPU fan (intermediate 2 only) that results in
a very quick settling of the temperature compared to a
constant-speed fan. For both intermediates the cooling
down is slower than the heating up because loading the
CPU introduces additional energy, but when the CPU is
idle there is no additional energy introduced for cooling
(the thermally controlled fan returns to its lowest speed
immediately after the load inducement stops).
There are other dependencies that are non-linear in
general, but within our operating conditions we assume
them to be roughly linear. In general temperature does
not change linearly with CPU load, but depends on the
mix of instructions executed as well as possible CPU
frequency changes. Since our CPUs ran with constant
frequency and we always generated load with cpuburn
we assume this relation is roughly linear. In general
clock-skew does not change linearly with CPU load, but
for typical temperatures inside PC cases the relation is
also roughly linear [2].
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Figure 6. Comparison of normalised clock-skew output of linearised simulation model and empirical measurements for intermediate host




















































Skew                 Case Temp              Room Temp
Figure 7. Variable clock skew and case/room temperature


















































Skew                 Case Temp              Room Temp
Figure 8. Variable clock skew and case/room temperature
during night (intermediate host 1)
For each intermediate host we generated a linear
model from the non-linear model using the Matlab
Simulink model linearisation function linmod (lineari-
sation for individual blocks based on pre-programmed
analytic block Jacobians). Figure 6 compares the output
of the linearised model with the de-trended normalised
empirical data (average over all 10 signal periods).
For intermediate 1 the linear model matches quite well,
although it does deviate slightly in the cool-down phase.
For intermediate 2 the linear model does not match as
well because it cannot capture the very steep temperature
rise and settling.
IV. CHANNEL NOISE
In order to estimate the noise on the channel we mea-
sured clock-skew changes of the intermediate hosts, but
without any CPU load inducement. We also measured
the temperature inside the room and the PC case.
In the following graphs we show the temperatures
(both normalised on the minimum temperature of each
series) and the remotely measured variable clock skew
for intermediate 1. Figure 7 shows a few hours in the
afternoon/evening. The case temperature is fluctuating
within a few 0.1 degrees Celsius without a clear trend
and does not closely follow the room temperature before
20:00 hours. Overall the variable clock skew looks
similar to random noise.
Figure 8 shows 8–9 hours during the night when the
room and case temperature are decreasing and the clock
skew is decreasing accordingly. Thus the variable clock
skew is not random but has a clear trend following the
trend of the ambient temperature.
During the day temperature changes inside the case are
not highly correlated with the room-temperature changes.
This is probably because the intermediate PC was located
in close proximity to two other PCs that were actively
used during the day. Another factor introducing noise
during the day could have been the presence of a human
– also in close proximity to the intermediate PC. During
the night when all PCs were idle and no humans were
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Figure 9. QQ plots of de-trended variable clock skew during day (left) and night (right) for intermediate host 1















































Figure 10. QQ plots of de-trended variable clock skew during day (left) and night (right) for intermediate host 2
present, the case temperature shows exactly the same
change over time as the room temperature (but at 3.2
degrees Celsius higher). For intermediate 2 the results
are similar.
The noise is clearly not Gaussian because of the
ambient changes. However, we de-trended the data from
the ambient changes. We used a LOWESS smoother [10]
to compute a smoothed series of data points. The de-
trended series was then computed by subtracting the
smoothed series from the actual data series. In the
following we investigate whether the de-trended noise
has a Gaussian distribution.
We used the Shapiro-Wilk statistical test of normality.
Table I in the Appendix shows the statistics for all
data and for 96% of the data (2% outliers removed at
each edge). For intermediate 1 with outliers removed we
cannot reject the hypothesis that the data is Normally
distributed (99% significance level). However, for inter-
mediate 2 we cannot draw the same conclusion, as the
resulting p-values are too low.
Figure 9 and figure 10 show quantile-quantile (QQ)
plots of the empirical distributions against the theoret-
ical Normal distribution for both intermediate hosts. In
all graphs the points follow the quantile-quantile line
closely, except at the edges. This indicates that the
empirical distributions are roughly Gaussian, except for
some outliers.
V. CHANNEL CAPACITY
The channel is time-invariant, and we showed that the
noise is approximately Gaussian. Therefore, we model
the temperature covert channel as an AWGN channel.
The capacity of this channel is [5]:







where B is the bandwidth of the channel, P is the
average signal power and N is the average noise power.
The temperature-based covert channel is basically a
base-band system acting as a low-pass filter on the input
signal. To estimate the bandwidth we need to estimate
the upper cut-off frequency, which is commonly defined
as the frequency where the power of the output has
decreased by 3 decibel (dB). For intermediate 1 we com-
pute the bandwidth directly from the linear simulation
model (Bode plot). For intermediate 2 the linear model
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is not a good fit and we estimate the bandwidth by
simulating different signal period lengths and identifying
when the power has decreased by approximately 3 dB.
The channel bandwidths are B1 ≈ 0.000434 Hz for
intermediate 1 and B2 ≈ 0.000455 Hz for intermedi-
ate 2. This means the period of the signal is approx-
imately 2304 s (intermediate 1) and 2250 s (intermedi-
ate 2), which is equivalent to 1152 s load followed by
1152 s idle time and 1125 s load followed by 1125 s idle
time. This is broadly consistent with the results from
the empirical measurements (see Figure 5). For inter-
mediate 1 the measured 1200 s load inducement signal
has approximately 52% of the power, which is exactly
what the model predicts. For intermediate 2 the measured
1200 s load inducement signal has approximately 47%
of the power. The model predicts roughly 53%, but it is
hard to measure the low signal power exactly.
Figure 11 shows the channel capacity based on the
SNR in dB for intermediate 1 (C1) and intermediate 2
(C2). The capacity increases almost linearly with the
SNR for larger SNRs. However, the sending power is
not unlimited and hence the capacity cannot increase to
infinity. The question is: what SNRs can be achieved?
We estimate the average power of signal and noise
by computing the power spectral density (power per
frequency band), integrating over all frequency bands
within the channel bandwidth and then normalising the
power based on the number of samples of the signal. We
compute the average signal power based on the model
output for alternating 100% and 0% CPU load with a
frequency equal to the channel bandwidth. We compute
the average noise power from the empirically measured
de-trended noise signals, separately for day and night.
As expected for both intermediates the SNRs are
higher during the night, as there was more noise during
the day. For intermediate 2 the SNRs are smaller despite
lower noise because of the much smaller signal power.
Figure 11 shows the capacities CDay and CNight for the
day and night SNRs on both capacity curves.
Depending on the noise the capacity is between
0.0046 bits/s and 0.0059 bits/s (intermediate 1) and be-
tween 0.0030 bits/s and 0.0043 bits/s (intermediate 2).
This equates to around 16.4–21.1 and 10.8–15.4 bits
per hour. Note that these estimates are upper bounds,
because we assumed the noise power to be minimal (idle
intermediate host) and the signal power to be maximal
(100% CPU load with cpuburn). In reality the capacity
is likely to be lower, because the CPU load that the
(remote) covert sender can generate is smaller, and the
noise on the channel is likely to be larger (higher CPU
load jitter and/or higher network jitter).


























Figure 11. Channel capacity for both intermediate hosts based on
signal-to-noise ratio, where the points CDay and CNight depict the
capacities given the empirically measured channel noise during the
day and night on each capacity curve
Our capacity estimates are significantly higher than
the initial estimate of 2–8 bits per hour [2]. However, the
initial estimate was ad-hoc based on an inspection of the
experimental data and could not consider the improved
clock-skew measurement technique developed later [6].
The capacity of the channel is sufficient for attacking
anonymous servers since in this scenario only a few
bits need to be transmitted. The probability of choosing
a wrong host from the candidate set (a false positive)
is pFP = 2−n where n is the number of covert bits
transmitted [2]. For example, even if only 16 bits are
transmitted the probability of a false positive is only
pFP = 1.525879−5. Given our capacity estimates it takes
only 1–2 hours to transmit 16 bits.
However, using the channel for general-purpose com-
munications seems impractical, unless very short mes-
sages are sufficient. The channel also seems somewhat
irrelevant, as there exist many other network covert
channels with higher capacities [1]. On the other hand
there may be some situations in which this is the only
available channel [2].
The existence of covert channels with capacities of
less than one 1 bit/s is deemed acceptable in many
application environments [11]. However, in scenarios
where only few transmitted bits pose a threat to security,
such as in anonymisation networks, temperature-based
covert channels require handling. We discuss possible
countermeasures in the following section.
VI. COUNTERMEASURES
It is very difficult to completely eliminate the
temperature-based covert channel. However, a number
of measures could be employed to reduce its capacity.
A seemingly obvious way of eliminating the channel
is to prevent Bob’s remote sampling of the clock by
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removing all timestamps from all network protocols,
which could be done by the intermediate host or a
security gateway. However, removing the timestamps
negatively affects the performance and functionality of
protocols. For example, the TCP timestamp extension is
needed for improving performance of TCP and the HTTP
timestamp is needed for HTTP caching. Furthermore,
many low-level operating system events are triggered on
timer interrupts and could be remotely detected and used
instead of explicit timestamps [8].
A clock crystal that is not affected by temperature
changes eliminates the channel. However, temperature-
compensated clock crystals might not have adequate
accuracy [12]. Oven-compensated crystals have good
accuracy, but are very expensive and power hungry
[12]. Thus it seems unlikely that accurately compensated
crystals would ever be deployed on a large scale.
The opportunity for Alice to induce CPU load cannot
be completely eliminated. However remote load induce-
ment (scenario 1) could be limited if the network traffic
is throttled before it reaches the intermediate host or
in the worst case on the intermediate host itself before
it reaches an application. If Alice is located on the
intermediate (scenario 2) a similar measure is to limit
the amount of CPU time a process or user can use.
Another countermeasure is to increase the channel
noise by randomly varying CPU load on the intermediate
host or in the extreme case by continuously running the
CPU at full load. However, this strategy is obviously
very inefficient. Furthermore, care must be taken in the
implementation because the temperature does not only
depend on the CPU load but also on the specific mix of
instructions executed and hence different types of tasks
can have different temperature effects [12].
Detection of the covert channel is also not straight-
forward. A detector has to look for abnormal traffic or
CPU load patterns indicating either Alice or Bob. Hence
the detection accuracy depends on how normal patterns
look like at the intermediate host. Furthermore, Alice and
Bob could always vary their traffic or CPU load patterns
within some limits trying to evade detection, although
this would most likely also reduce the throughput.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We proposed a method for estimating the capacity
of Murdoch’s temperature-based covert channel [2]. We
developed a simulation model for modelling the relation
between CPU load and clock skew and used it to
determine the channel’s bandwidth and signal power. We
estimated the noise power empirically and also showed
that the de-trended noise is roughly Gaussian. Therefore,
we estimated the capacity using the well-known AWGN
channel model. For two different intermediate hosts we
showed that the upper bounds of the channel capacity
are 10.8–15.4 and 16.4–21.1 bits per hour respectively.
The capacity is sufficient for attacking anonymous
servers, but for general-purpose communications it is
quite small. Furthermore, in most scenarios there are
other network covert channels with higher capacities
available [1]. On the other hand in some situations the
temperature-based covert channel may be the only usable
channel [2].
In future work we aim to examine a larger number of
different PCs and compare their channel capacities. We
also plan to use our simulation model in combination
with the Matlab Simulink communications toolbox [9]
to measure the throughput of the channel depending on
different encoding techniques.
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APPENDIX
Table I shows the test statistic values and p-values
for the Shapiro-Wilk normality test performed for the
different clock-skew datasets (see Section IV).
Table I






Day (100%) 1 0.973  1%
Day (96%) 1 0.995 2.6%
Night (100%) 1 0.987  1%
Night (96%) 1 0.996 1.5%
Day (100%) 2 0.992 0.05%
Day (96%) 2 0.982  1%
Night (100%) 2 0.981  1%
Night (96%) 2 0.991  1%
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